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Introduction
Egypt has seen several waves of Islamist violence against "soft" targets in the According to Tohamy and Swinscoe (2000) , it accounted for 11.6% of GDP if one includes the secondary effects of tourist spending.
Even though the number of tourist victims in terrorist incidents tends to be relatively small and political violence represents only a negligible risk to an individual tourist, research shows that their effects on tourist numbers and tourism revenues can be severe, and violence in one destination induces a substitution effect between countries. The main themes explored in the empirical literature are (a) the extent and time profile of the substitution effect between countries suffering from political violence and safer choices; 2 (b) generalisation effects, where terrorism in one country cause a whole region to be perceived as risky; 3 (c) differences in attitudes to risks between countries. 4 However, attacks on tourists are generally only a small part of a wider picture of political violence and instability.
5 Neumayer (2004) points out that the literature on violence and tourism has mostly focused on the issue of terrorism, rather than looking at political instability more generally. People may be put off travelling to a destination where there is a high level of political or inter-community tension even if it does not pose a direct threat to tourists and / or where ethical concerns are raised regarding the government's treatment of the political opposition. 6 Neumayer demonstrates in his 1 http://www.euromonitor.com/factfile.aspx?country=EG. 2 E.g. Enders, et al (1991) ; Enders et al (1992) ; Drakos and Kutan (2003) ; Neumayer (2004) , Fielding and Shortland (2009) 3 E.g. Enders et al (1992) ; Drakos and Kutan (2003) . 4 E.g. Tremblay (1989) ; Fielding and Shortland (2008) . 5 Targeting foreign nationals may be used by insurgent or opposition groups to generate national and international publicity in countries where the government tightly controls the local media. Disrupting the tourist industry also directly harms government revenues and foreign exchange receipts. Attacking foreigners may also have ideological objectives where tourists are targeted as the indirect representatives of different ideological values and political cultures (Aziz, 1996) . 6 See for example: http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/egypt.
2004 panel study that in both authoritarian countries and in countries in which human rights violations are common, tourist flows are reduced. This paper takes Neumayer's innovation back to the country case study level and analyses the effects of several dimensions of political conflict on tourism in Egypt in the 1990s, where we have access to a highly detailed measure of political violence and counter-violence. The dataset records civilian, tourist and security force casualties as well as arrests of Islamists reported in the Egypt's Al Ahram newspaper. 7 We analyse monthly data on tourism in Egypt where previously only annual data has been used. 8 The paper firstly explores how tourists respond to various aspects of (Islamist) political violence directed against civilians. Secondly we explore the effects of counter-violence on tourist flows. The Egyptian government suppressed the opposition Islamist movements, rather than seeking political accommodation. The main approach has been to arrest and detain people suspected of political activism; but heavy-handed policing also resulted in civilian casualties in riots and demonstrations and gun-battles with armed extremists. Tourists are highly unlikely to become caught up in these security force activities, but may be put off by heavy security measures around tourist attractions or shun holidays in a location with a negative human rights image.
Thirdly, we consider regional spill-over from the conflict in Israel/Palestine.
On the one hand there is a high degree of substitutability between Red Sea resorts on the Egyptian and Israeli side of the border. On the other hand conflict in Israel may be expected to raise tension within Egypt 9 and has been directly linked to attacks on tourists on Egyptian soil. In all estimations we disaggregate between European and US tourists, who may have different attitudes to violence 10 and value Egyptian holidays for different reasons. These differences may make alternative destinations more or less easily substitutable.
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Our results show that potential tourists substitute away from Egypt in response to violent attacks on tourists, but not to local tensions, and that the response of 7 See Fielding and Shortland (2010) . 8 Aly and Strazicich (2000) ; Sakr and Massoud (2003) . 9 Fielding and Shortland (2010) . 10 Fielding and Shortland (2008) . 11 Neumayer (2004) .
European tourists is much more marked than that of tourists from the US. European tourists also respond negatively to the Egyptian government's crackdowns on the Islamist opposition, while no such effect is observed for US tourists. Although Egypt sees additional tourist flows when violence in the Israeli / Palestinian conflict increases, Egypt's government should be concerned about increasing tensions in Israel, because these sometimes result in violent attacks on Egyptian soil.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The following section reviews the literature on the effect of political violence on tourism and sets out our hypotheses. Section 3 gives some background information on the political conflict in Egypt and gives details on our measures of political violence. Section 4 describes the model of tourist destination choice; section 5 describes the data, estimations and results. Section 6 discusses the results and concludes.
Literature Review and Research Hypotheses
There is now a growing literature on the economic effects of political violence on macroeconomic outcomes (much of which is reviewed in Frey et al., 2007) . An important part of this literature investigates the effects of violent conflict on tourist destination choices. The typical modern tourist seeks relaxation and will switch between destinations in response to events that could potentially undermine the enjoyment of the holiday, even if the probability of being caught up in such an event is almost zero. The exact degree of substitution depends on whether a country's attractions are specific to the country and particularly valued by tourists (e.g. "sunny beaches" versus unique cultural and geographical features).
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Most of the literature focuses on the response of tourists to terrorist attacks, where tourists may be killed accidentally or deliberately targeted. The literature demonstrates significant, but temporary reductions in tourist flows in response to terrorist attacks in both country case studies and regional studies. However, there seem to be differences between countries in the time profile of the reaction of tourist arrivals and revenues, depending on the structure of the tourism industry (e.g. package holidays versus individual bookings) and how far in advance tourists generally book their holiday. Neumayer (2004) . 13 , Enders et al. (1992) , Fleischer and Buccola (2002) , Pizam and Smith (2000) ; Pizam and Fleischer (2002) . the likely time profile of the response within a country is important information if the government decides to provide a subsidy to the tourism industry in response to terrorist attacks. While there are already two case studies confirming a temporary reduction in tourism to Egypt in response to violent events, both use annual data and focus on major violent events only.
14 There is also a question of the extent to which the severity of terrorist events matters for tourism. Pizam and Fleischer (2002) and Krakover (2001) show that tourism into Israel is negatively affected by the severity of terrorist attacks (in terms of the number of people killed and injured). We use an index of the number of casualties as our measure of the severity of trans-national terrorist activity and in addition check whether the Luxor attack in November 1997 (which caused an unusually high number of casualties and was extensively covered in the international press) had a disproportionate effect on tourist flows.
H1: Tourists substitute (temporarily) away from Egyptian holidays in response to terrorist attacks in Egypt directly involving tourists. Large scale attacks may have disproportionate effects.
Neumayer (2004) looks at the effect of political instability and political violence more broadly in a dynamic cross country panel, arguing that tourists may also be put off by the repression of opposition movements, human rights abuses and police presence around tourist installations. He shows that tourists are affected in their destination choice not only by terrorist events, but also by violent political protest and repressive measures, such as restrictions of civil and political liberties, implemented by authoritarian governments. We re-examine this issue at the country level, where we are able to look at variations in political repression in much more detail than is 14 Aly and Strazicich (2000) ; Sakr and Massoud (2003) 15 Pizam and Fleischer (2002) also show that a count variable of the number of terrorist attacks in Israel in a month is econometrically preferred to the monthly casualty count variable. In Egypt the number of months with more than one event is very low and we have not adopted this strategy. The third issue we explore in this paper is the direction of spill-over effects from political violence in Israel / Palestine. Past studies have come to different conclusions about how violence in one country affects other countries in the same region. Some countries appear to have benefited from marketing themselves as "safe" alternative destinations within a region (Mansfeld 1996, Hall and Sullivan, 1996) , but Drakos and Kutan (2003) Finally, all of our estimates make use of disaggregated tourist flows, distinguishing between tourists from the United States and tourists from Europe.
American and European tourists may have a different attitude to risk, violence and the visible presence of firearms on the street. The first reason is that people from a society 16 This is discussed in more detail in section 3. 17 Drakos and Kutan (2003) . 18 For example the hotel bombings on the Sinai Peninsula and the killing of eighteen Greek tourists in Cairo in April 1996 in the mistaken belief that they were Israeli tourists. 19 This is shown in Fielding and Shortland (2010 Similarly, the Freedom House and Polity IV databases are able 20 Fielding and Shortland (2008) . 21 Neumayer (2004) . 22 The history of the conflict is discussed in detail in Abdo (2000 ) Wickham (2002 . For an empirical study of the conflict see Fielding and Shortland (2010 However, there is no evidence to suggest that there were major changes in editorial policy regarding what proportion and type of incidents are reported in the period under investigation. There is therefore no reason to suppose that there will be any bias in parameter estimates in a pure time-series model. In this paper we focus on the four dimensions of violence discussed below.
Attacks on Tourists
Attacks on tourists are illustrated in However, Egypt's largest daily newspaper Al Ahram provided details of 39 attacks on the tourism industry alone, in 31 of which foreign nationals were wounded or killed. 24 In 1993 Freedom House revised its evaluation of political rights and civil liberties in Egypt from "Partially Free" to "Not Free"; this rating remained constant for the remainder of our sample period. In the Marshall et al's Polity IV database Egypt's score on the Polity variable is -3 from 1990-1998 and then -6 for 1999 and 2000. 25 The dataset was compiled for ESRC grant (RES-000-22-0312) and is available at http://www.prio.no/jpr/datasets. 26 Unfortunately it is only available for the 1990s. 27 The editor of Al Ahram is appointed by the President. 28 The publication Civil Society of the Ibn Khaldoun Centre has occasionally published political violence data, but details and updates are not available as the centre was closed and its founder and several of the research staff were arrested in 2000.
resulted in a huge increase in security measures around tourist attractions. There were no further attacks on tourists during the sample period.
Islamist violence directed against Egyptians
Our proxies for the level of community tension are based on the violence perpetrated by Islamist groups against Egyptians, illustrated in Figure 
Counter-violence
The Egyptian security forces' response to Islamist violence reported in the Egyptian media includes arrests, detention (with and without trial) and death sentences for some of those convicted of terrorist offences.
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The wording of the reports in Al Ahram suggests that members of the political opposition are regarded as "terrorist suspects"; or at least, that is how the government wishes the media to portray them.
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Arrests were sometimes preceded by gun battles in which both suspected Islamists 29 Human rights organisations such as Amnesty International additionally report widespread human rights violations, such as torture and deaths in custody, e.g. http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/egypt. 30 E.g. Al Ahram reports arrests of "dangerous terrorists" during which security forces found "antigovernment leaflets" and "knives", suggesting a rather more peaceful type of opposition. and innocent bystanders were killed and wounded. Demonstrations have also been subject to heavy-handed policing, often resulting in casualties and large-scale arrests.
We are not able to distinguish between different categories of civilians (political dissidents / extremists / bystanders), and so we aggregate all attacks on civilians. The number of civilians reported as being killed, wounded and arrested by the security forces are summarised in Figure 
4: A Model of Tourist Destination Choice
In this section we derive a regression equation for demand for tourism in Egypt. This is based on the standard discrete choice theory in Maddala (1983) . The model concerns a population of people who have already decided to take a vacation, and are deciding where to go.
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Let the net utility an individual i derives from taking a vacation in location m {1,..., M} in month t be designated v imt . We will assume that each person's utility is of the form:
(1) 31 In the estimations below we use politically motivated arrests (cas) to capture the intensity of Egyptian counter-violence efforts 32 http://www2.iol.co.il/btselem. 33 See Enders et al (1992) for an explicit model of a two-stage budgeting decision.
where  mt is the average level of utility from visiting location m in month t for the vacationing population and u imt is an individual's idiosyncratic deviation from this average. X mt is a vector of identifiable time-varying factors that impact on one's net utility from a vacation in a particular location (including how expensive it is), and  mt is a stochastic term reflecting the unpredictable component of the average utility level (fads and fashions). We further assume that individual i chooses location m in period t if and only if:
It can be shown (Maddala, 1983 ) that if for any two locations (m,n) the distribution of u imt is independent of that of u int , and if each has a Weibull distribution,
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then the probability of any one individual choosing location m in period t is:
So, for a large population, the ratio of the number of people in period t visiting location m (p mt ) to the number visiting location n (p nt ) can be written as:
and hence:
Location m here is to be interpreted as Egypt; the identity of the reference location n will be discussed later. If we know the functional forms of  mt (.) and  nt (.), then we can fit equation (6) to time-series data. In what follows, we assume that it is possible to find a linear specification such that:
34 Appendix I discusses the relaxation of this assumption.
where  t is a linear function of  mt and  nt .
We will proceed with the assumption that [X mt -X nt ] comprises (a) seasonal factors, (b) the relative enjoyability of the two locations and (c) the several dimensions of political violence in Egypt and Israel. Our regressions are based on an equation of the form:
h st is a dummy for month s. w mt is the enjoyability of location m in period t, to which an expectations operator is attached, because new visitors will only find out whether they like a place when they get there. Z mt is a vector of violence indicators in Egypt, the reference location n being assumed to be completely safe. Tourists are concerned about violence in the current month and also expected violence in the next month, because visits may straddle two months.
One might also wonder whether monthly variations in the relative cost of different locations make a difference to tourist numbers. However, our empirical measures of relative cost never produced robust, interpretable statistically significant coefficients. It seems that, in our sample period at least, monthly variations in cost had no substantial impact on tourism to Egypt.
Application of the model requires us to specify the expectations formation process. We will work with the following assumptions:
Equation (9) builds some herding behaviour into the model: if a destination has been popular in the past, people are more likely to consider it today. Equation (10) 
The elements of the violence vector Z are as follows.
ln(1 + tkw), where tkw is the number of tourists killed and wounded in Egypt.
ln(1 + cas), where cas is the number of arrests by Egyptian security forces.
ln(1 + csk), where csk is the number of civilians and security forces killed by radicals.
where iki is the number of Israelis killed in political attacks in Israel.
ln(1 + kwg), where kwg is the number of deaths in fighting in the West Bank / Gaza.
We expect the coefficients on these variables to be negative (H1-H4), and larger in absolute size for European tourists than for American tourists (H5).
Logarithmic transformations are used to ensure that the variables are approximately symmetrically distributed. ADF tests for the order of integration of the variables indicate them all to be I(0); further details are available on request.
Empirical Modelling and Data

Data
Our sample period covers the 1990s, starting in March 1991 (to exclude any effects from the first Gulf war) and ending December 2000, the last month for which political violence data are available. Equation (11) is to be fitted to data for tourist arrivals into
Egypt from (a) America and (b) Western Europe. In order to estimate the parameters of equation (11), we need to construct a dependent variable in which the number of visitors to Egypt from a certain population (American and European tourists respectively) is expressed relative to the number of visitors from that population to another location.
We use tourist flows to two comparison countries, which both have consistent datasets of monthly tourist arrivals disaggregated by nationality for the sample period.
Firstly we use tourism data from Malta, which can be considered as a "safe" alternative destination in the Eastern Mediterranean. Ideally we would use a larger selection of destinations in the Mediterranean, such as Spain, Greece, Turkey and
Cyprus, but it was impossible to obtain monthly data disaggregated by nationality for the required period. Moreover, the recent history of these countries means that they cannot be considered 100% safe.
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Malta receives a relatively small number of tourists compared to Egypt (particularly from the United States), introducing the potential for excessive noise in the ratio of tourist arrivals to the two destinations.
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We therefore also The five violence variables are measured using the data collated from Al Ahram and from the B'Tselem database, which are described in Section 3 above. In all cases the violence statistics are expressed in terms of (the log of) the number of fatalities or arrests per month. All equations also include seasonally varying intercepts to take into account variations in tourist flows according to holiday periods and weather conditions, though these are not reported in the results presented and analysed below.
Results
Tables 1 Solving out the dynamics of the regression equations, we can also compute "long-run" elasticities that predict the impact on tourism of a hypothetical permanent change in the level of violence. (Although the historical violence series we are using are stationary, it is always possible that there will be a structural break in one of the series in the future. Indeed, there was such a break in the Israeli fatality data just after the end of our sample, with the onset of the al Aqsa Intifada.) In the long run, the elasticity for Americans reacting to a permanent increase in the level of violence against tourists is around -0.6 to -0.9. The effect on European tourist numbers is somewhat larger. For the Europeans / Malta regressions the elasticity is around -1.3.
In the Europeans / Thailand regressions the elasticity is lower at around -0.5, but there is an additional and much larger effect from the attack on tourists in Luxor in 1997, which suggests that European might be particularly sensitive to large-scale attacks. 
Long run elasticities of tourist numbers to a permanent increase in violence
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European arrivals into Egypt increase by 3 -5 per cent after a small lag.
The long run elasticity in the Malta regressions is 0.34, whereas in the Thai regressions it is lower and not statistically significant, suggesting that some caution is appropriate in interpreting this result.
The main difference between American and European tourists is in their reaction to the Egyptian security forces response to political violence. Demand for Egyptian holidays contracts by 1-2% with a unit increase in ln(1 + cas) soon after the shock and if the crackdown is sustained in the long run, tourist numbers drop by 10-12%.
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Thus on average, European tourists do respond to changes in the level of the state's response to insurgency, which might be viewed by some as 43 In the Americans / Thailand unrestricted regression the positive coefficients on contemporaneous ln(1 + iki) are not significant and the AIC indicates the omission of contemporaneous ln(1 + iki) from the regression. 44 These long run coefficients are highly significant.
excessive. American tourists seem not to pay any attention to this dimension of the conflict.
45
The results are mostly robust to the choice of comparison country (i.e. Malta or Thailand) and we are therefore confident that the empirical results generated are not spurious. The main discrepancy between the samples is that the Europeans / Thailand regressions indicate a particularly strong response to a large-scale terrorist attack and a lesser response to incidents which affect only a small number of people, while the Europeans / Malta regressions suggest a strong response to all types of attacks.
Interpretation and Conclusion
Our results show that the campaign of radical Islamist organisations succeeded in inflicting heavy losses on the Egyptian tourist industry when their attacks were directly targeted at the tourist industry, confirming Hypothesis 1. Even though the actual danger of being caught up in a violent attack was extremely small even at the height of the conflict, many tourists decided to stay away from Egypt. Direct attacks on tourist installations in which foreign citizens are killed or wounded have an immediate effect on people's destination choices when making bookings 46 and it takes more than a year before tourist numbers fully recover after a successful attack. If tourist flows in the aftermath of an attack are stimulated by aggressive price cuts, the actual cost to the tourist industry is likely to be significantly higher than suggested by the contraction in tourist numbers.
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In addition there is some evidence that European tourists react disproportionately to attacks in which there are large numbers of foreign victims, as indicated by the large and highly significant coefficient on the Luxor temple incident.
Hypothesis 2 is supported by the evidence as Egypt's human rights record does appear to have featured to some extent in European citizens' holiday destination 45 If anything a positive coefficient on the long-run elasticity suggests that Americans are reassured by a strong security force response to Islamist violence. However, this result is not statistically significant. 46 The maximum effect appears to occur at the point corresponding to the average tourist's advance booking between 3 and 4 months ahead of the holiday. 47 Tourism revenues have been shown to take much longer to recover than the number of tourists (Tohamy and Swinscoe, 2000) . Local hotel prices will be endogenous, which is the reason for their exclusion from the regression equations. To the extent that tourist numbers impact on prices, our test equation should be viewed as a reduced-form expression.
choices. If the security forces crack-down is a one-off event, the response is relatively small and short-lived. However, a long-term, heavy-handed security policy appears to discourage significant numbers of Europeans from considering an Egyptian holiday.
As European arrivals make up about 60% of total tourism to Egypt (versus 6.5% for the US); the Egyptian government should at least consider this effect when designing its security policy.
We have no evidence for our hypothesis 3. Tourists appear to have cared mainly about their own safety, rather than being influenced by low level political conflict between local groups, where the relevant locations can easily be avoided.
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While this refutes hypothesis 3 in the sample analysed here, it is possible that this result would be different after September 2001. People have become more concerned about Islamist movements and about local tensions bubbling over into violent attacks on foreign interests and this issue will be investigated in future work.
Conflict in Israel has an ambiguous effect on the Egyptian tourist industry.
As outlined in hypothesis 4 tourists seem to substitute holidays in Egypt for holidays in Israel when violence increases in Israel. This is probably due to the high degree of substitutability between different Red Sea beach resorts. However, political violence in Israel does occasionally spill over into Egypt, such as the attacks on tourists and hotels in the Sinai.
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This has unambiguously negative consequences for the Egyptian tourism industry, underlining the importance of the Egyptian government's involvement in the Middle East peace process.
Finally, hypothesis 5 is confirmed by the interesting differences between US and European tourists. European tourists are more sensitive to political violence in Egypt than their American counterparts. This may be because a large number of Europeans go to Egypt on beach holidays, for which there are many (safe) alternative destinations. European tourists therefore react very strongly to violence against the tourism industry. For US tourists the emphasis is more likely to be on Egypt's archaeological attractions, for which there are no close substitutes. Europeans also respond negatively to scaled up counter-violence operations (which in Egypt often ignore human rights), whereas US tourists do not. One possible explanation is that human rights issues are less well publicised in the US media than in Europe, whereas 48 That is local, intercommunity violence in Egypt and fighting in the West Bank and Gaza. 49 Fielding and Shortland (2010) .
attacks on foreigners do make international headlines and influence (in-) official travel advice. Another possible explanation is that the average American tourist may be more relaxed about the presence of armed guards around tourist venues or even reassured by a strong state response to terrorist threats.
Given these results there are strong policy implications regarding the importance of not letting a political conflict escalate to the point where radical splinter groups attack foreign nationals to publicise their cause. However, a heavy-handed state policy against the Islamist opposition can also have negative effects on tourism.
There is some evidence for such an effect with respect to European tourists, who provide the majority of tourism receipts in Egypt. The results might also motivate a policy of subsidising the tourism sector in response to attacks on tourists until tourism levels recover a year later. Finally, efforts to revise the image of Egypt through advertising campaigns in the aftermath of attacks should be primarily directed at the European tourist market, which reacts very sensitively to violence and provides the majority of tourism revenues for Egypt. 
Maddala G. (1983) Limited Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics
The validity of the model in the text therefore depends on either the universal independence of the u imt distributions, or else that Egypt, Malta and Thailand belong to the same group within a GEV framework. This is a necessary condition for the validity of the log-linear functional form in equation (5) of the text, and in Tables 1-4. (The jointly sufficient conditions are independence plus the linearity of the  mt (·)
functions.) If the countries belong to different groups, or if some distribution more complex than GEV applies, then a linear model will no longer be valid. In the text, we assume that the u imt are independent of each other and the  mt (·) functions are linear.
This null hypothesis can be tested by applying a RESET test (Ramsey, 1969) to the models in Tables 1-4 . If our models pass a RESET test, then we cannot reject the null. otherwise, forecast errors are relatively small, and there is no significant change in the estimate of any individual slope coefficient. In other words, the year 2000 did not fit the normal seasonal pattern, but the parameters of interest appear still to be stable. 
